|
Part XXI - Questions related to
Perceptuality (part 2)
Perceptuality of internal perceptions
Q. If we accept the perceptibility criteria as stated
above then we cannot extend this to internal perceptions.
If we extend it to internal perceptions involving mental
states then we may run into an infinite regress of mental
states themselves having mental states. Since that is
not admitted, the perceptuality criteria cannot be validated
for internal perceptions.
Internal perceptions involve having a mental state
as an object of perception. For perceptuality, the object
should be the same as the consciousness-existence of
the subject (knower), together with a vRRitti consisting
of the attributes of the object. A vRRitti is a mental
state and the situation for internal perception reduces
to a mental state having a mental state as an object
and thus it leads to infinite regress.
A: That is not so, says VP. Even though we avoid infinite
regress by not admitting a metal state to be an object
of another mental state, a mental state is allowed to
be its own object. Hence the object is not separate
from the mental state itself. We have consciousness-existence
of the subject not different from the object, which
is consciousness-existence as a mental state. The contents
of the mental state are the attributes of itself as
an object, such as happiness, anger, compassion, etc.
The mental state itself is the object of perception
and there is no need of a separate object. Either way
the end result is the same. The subject or knower perceives
these emotions directly and immediately, as these mental
moods arise in the mind. VP states that the criteria
for perceptuality are validated even in internal perceptions
of emotions: happiness, anger, love, etc.
Further explanation about the mental states
Here, VP extends the definition of a mental state.
Up to now, we have considered a mental state to be a
vRRitti, a perturbation in the mind which has its substantial
content as the existence and consciousness of the knower
and its transactional content as the attributes of the
object. One can think of a vRRitti like a wave in the
ocean which, when it arises, is illumined in the light
of consciousness of the sAkshI. The reflected light
of consciousness from the illumination is the knowledge
of the vRRitti or mental state. Hence, all mental states
are illumined by the sAkshI, the witnessing consciousness,
and are known because of the reflection, as in the analogy
of light falling on a body and the reflected light revealing
the object. We have next extended the mental state to
include internal perceptions, the contents of the vRRitti
being emotions such as happiness, anger, etc. A mental
state itself is an object of perception since, unlike
in the case of external perceptions, there is no object
external to the mind. This concept is now extended further
to include even the mind with its attributes as an object
of perception.
The mind, as we know, is (subtle) matter and thus an
inert entity. It is not self-effulgent so that it might
know itself. For it to be known, it has to be illumined
by the light of the illuminating consciousness of the
sAkshI and the reflected light of consciousness forms
the knowledge of the mind. Hence, mind itself is an
object of knowledge. Thus mind is a peculiar entity,
which acts as both the subject as well as an object.
(Because of this, there is lot of confusion, particularly
in western philosophies, trying to consider mind as
the conscious entity, a subject, whilst at the same
time considering it as an object for analysis.) Mind
can act both as a subject and an object. When I say ‘I know my mind’ or ‘I changed
my mind’, I am treating the mind as an object
that I know and that I can change. Thus, the mind and
its attributes are directly illumined and cognized as
such. VP says that, in considering the mind with its
attributes as objective knowledge, we can consider the
mind as though it is also a mental state with its attributes
as the contents. Hence, perceptuality criteria can now
be applied in the cognition of the total mind and its
attributes. Thus, the definition of perceptuality is
quite broad.
Proceed to the next
essay.
|
