Part XXXXVIII -
Perception in Dream
When we perceive something to be other than what it
is (such as a snake instead of a rope), we make an error.
This is called adhyAsa – an error of superimposition.
Thus, the perception of silver instead of nacre is due
to adhyAsa. I am projecting silver on an object in which
there is no silver. The projection is done by my mind.
In general, error arises due to ignorance or nescience
of the nature of the object that is being perceived.
Since I do not know that it is nacre, I take it as silver,
based upon the partial or dominant sense input of silveriness
of the object. That I do not know that it is nacre is
due to what is called an ‘adventitious defect’,
i.e. it is due to defects in the auxiliary causes that
are involved in the operation of perception, e.g. insufficient
light, etc. Because of these defects, the senses are
unable to gather all the attributive knowledge of the
nacre that would have revealed the true nature of the
object. Instead, I am gathering only the predominant
attribute of silveriness, which is also the characteristic
of silvery objects. Thus there is some similarity in
the attributive content of the actual object and the
object projected. This similarity is called ‘sAdRRishya’.
Hence, the criterion for seeing something other than
what it is comes from the auxiliary or adventitious
factors that are involved in perception. Here VP gives
an example of a dream projection of objects, in which
one sees, say, a chariot, which is not really there
but projected by the mind and hence illusory. The adventitious
cause of this projection is ‘sleep’. This
discussion leads naturally to the analysis of objects
perceived in dream.
Objection: In the dream, one does not perceive
any objects, but only recollects them from memory. Objects
such as a chariot etc are those that were seen before and
there is a memory associated with the previous perception.
The recollection is only in the form of words or associated
with words. One need not assume that one is creating a chariot
in the dream since the dream is in the mind of the dreamer.
Besides, the chariot is too big to fit in the mind of the
dreamer; it is too cumbersome. Hence, there is no question
of creation of objects such as a chariot in the dream; it
is only a recollection from memory.
Reply: Not so. If the chariot is only a
recollection, then I would not make the statement that ‘I
see a chariot’ or ‘I saw a chariot in my dream’.
In addition, it would violate the scriptural statements that
establish the creation of the objects such as chariot in
a dream. [na tatra rathA na rathayogA na panthAnO bhavanti,
atha rathAn rathayogAn pathassRijate .. Br. Up. IV-3-10.]
Initially (in the dream state), there are neither chariots,
nor the horses to pull those chariots nor the roads for them
to traverse. Therefore the chariots, horses and roads are
created (in the dream). Therefore, like the silver appearing
in the nacre, the chariot etc. that are experienced in a
dream are also a projection of the mind. They remain as real
for the perceiver as long as the dream lasts or the projection
lasts. Generally, these projections are negated by the subsequent
knowledge arising from further perception. In the case of
dream objects, the objects may exist as long as the dream
lasts. In the case of the silver projected on the nacre,
it would last until a subsequent experience involving further
attributive knowledge of that object establishes that the
object is nacre and not real silver.
Objection: If a real chariot is seen in
the dream, there should be eyes to see it and the chariot
should also be spatially located for the seeing eyes to see.
Since there is no ‘space’ inside the mind that
could accommodate a whole chariot, one has to assume some
imaginary space in which the chariot in the dream can be
located. Where is the substratum to support the chariot spatially,
and also object-wise? Essentially, what is the substantive
of the chariot for its existence and for its perception,
even if one argues that the chariot is a superimposition,
similar to silver being superimposed on nacre?
Reply: The objection is not valid. The infinite
consciousness which is self-effulgent is the substratum of
the chariot, etc. Because the chariot is experienced in the
dream, it is not unreal like the son of a barren woman. Since
the chariot and other objects are experienced as existent
in the dream, the consciousness manifesting as existence
forms a substratum for all. The space where they are located
is also part of that experience and hence is a superimposition
on the consciousness because of which one is conscious of
the space. Because one sees the chariot in the dream, the
eyes that see the chariot are also of the same order of reality
as the objects that are seen. All are projected as existent ‘this’ and
existent ‘that’ on the substantive consciousness.
Since the experience is in the subtle form as ‘this’,
the knowledge of the experience will also be in the
form ‘this is a chariot’ and not ‘I
am a chariot’, even though the limiting consciousness
of the jIva forms the substantive for all, as was discussed
before. Some are of the opinion that dream chariots
and other objects seen in the dream are transformation
of mAyA preserving the same order of reality as the
cause, while others are of the opinion that they are
transformation (pariNAma) through the medium of mind.
The mANDUkya kArikA-s present the analysis more precisely
and we will examine this later.
Objection: According to the above interpretation,
chariots and other objects are superimposed on pure consciousness
in order for one to be conscious of them. Since this substantive,
pure limiting existence-consciousness, sAkshI, is not recognized
in the dream (tat sAkshAtkAra abhAvena), the objects projected
in the dream will also remain in the waking state. The dream
state may be gone but, according to your theory, the objects
are not imagined in the dream but are projected as real for
the dreamer with the same substantive, namely the limiting
consciousness-existence. The substantive does not change
from dream to waking. Hence, in principle, there is no difference
between the objects projected in the waking state with substantive
limiting witnessing consciousness and the objects projected
in the dream state. The state may change but the objects
should remain, since the substantive remains the same. Therefore
one should see all the objects, which were created in the
dream, in the waking state also. The millions of dollars
that we won in the dream-lottery can now be cashed in at
the bank in the waking state,if your theory is valid.
Reply: In response to the objection, VP
discusses two possible types of destruction. The first involves
destruction of the perceived object along with its the material
cause and the second is destruction of the perceived object
without destruction of the material cause. The first is called ‘nullification’,
in which the material cause is removed or completely eliminated
(bAdha), and the second is called ‘cessation’ or ‘ending’,
in which the material cause is not nullified.
The nullification of the material cause occurs only
when the substantive is realized or recognized. The
reality of the superimposed object arose only because
of the non-recognition of the substantive due to nescience.
Since the substantive for the whole world is pure consciousness,
there is no other material for the objective world other
than mAyA or nescience. Hence, upon gaining knowledge
of the substantive which is pure consciousness, the
material cause which is mAyA gets nullified. This is
the first type of destruction, involving the knowledge
of the substantive. If I realize that a pot is clay,
then I recognize that there is no material pot other
than its name and form. The gaining of knowledge of
the substantive eliminated any reality attributed to
the object pot other than the name and form of its substantive
clay. It becomes ‘potty-clay’ instead of ‘clay
pot’. There is no substantive pot other than the
clay.
There is a second type of perception due to adventitious
defects. If one is color blind then, because of the
eye-defect, one sees objects with colors which are not
there. If this defect is corrected, that correction
does not eliminate the object but only eliminates the
wrong color assigned to the object. Similarly, when
we have double vision of objects due to defective eyes,
correction of the eye-sight eliminates the vision of
duality but not the object that was perceived. Hence,
VP says that the substantive limiting consciousness-existence,
sAkshI, is not realized as being the substantive for
the objects of the dream, and therefore the objects
may not be nullified because of that reason upon awakening
from the dream. There is, however, no reason why they
cannot be destroyed by the elimination of the adventitious
defects that produced them in the first place, just
as double vision of objects is destroyed by correction
of eye-sight. Just as a jar can be eliminated by beating
it with a club, even though we have not realized the
substantive clay, what is there to prevent cessation
of the object projected in the dream by the elimination
of the adventitious defect that caused the dream projection,
namely sleep?
We will continue further discussion on this topic in the next
post.
Proceed to the next
essay.
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