Part 4 - Mechanism of anumAna Pt. 1
We are discussing the anumAna pramANa as a means
of knowledge. Inferential knowledge follows (anumiti – comes
after) some other knowledge, usually perceptual. The
classical example is: I see smoke on the distant hill,
and I infer that the hill on fire, even though I do
not actually see the fire. Here, the knowledge of
the smoke and the distant hill occur through the perceptual
process. Hence, they are objective knowledge based
on attributive content. This knowledge is immediate
and direct as we discussed before.
However, knowledge of the fire is not immediate and
direct since I do not perceive it. I infer that
the distant hill is on fire based upon the concomitant
relationship between smoke and fire, which is called
vyApti. The inference depends on this relation or
vyApti; and if I do not know the relation, I cannot
infer that there is fire on the distant hill. Technically,
the terms used in formulating this means of knowledge
are as follows:
hetu, li~Nga, mark or middle term - refers to the
smoke on the distant hill;
sAdhya, character or major premise - refers to the fire on
the distant hill.
The hill itself is called pakSha, the minor term.
The conclusion or inference, however, is based on the concomitant
relation between the smoke and the fire and is called vyApti.
The vyApti in this case is: wherever there is smoke
there is fire, as is observed in the kitchen. The
kitchen provides a dRRiShTAnta [instance, example]
for establishing the concomitant relation between
smoke and fire. We have mentioned that the vyApti
is asama, meaning it is unidirectional; i.e. wherever
there is smoke there is fire but not the other way
round. Wherever there is fire there need not be smoke.
For example we do not see smoke with a red-hot iron
ball.
The invariable concomitance or vyApti between the middle term
or hetu (smoke) and the major term, sAdhya (fire) is the back
bone of the inferential knowledge or syllogism. It provides
a universal proposition showing the connection between the
two. It has to be acquired by observation and generalization.
The observation used refers to a kitchen (in olden days where
fire-wood was commonly used for cooking), that smoke is always
seen whenever a fire is present; and this observation is now
generalized to: ‘wherever there is smoke there must be
fire’. This forms the vyApti or invariable concomitant
relation.
As per Indian logic, the universal proposition is
supported by at least one observation, if there are
no contradictory observations. Hence inferential knowledge,
according to India logic, involves deductive and inductive
reasoning; and there is no separation between the
two, as in western logic. anumAna or inferential knowledge
is therefore, an inductive generalization with deductive
particularization. The particular observation is:
I see smoke when there is a fire in the kitchen. The
deductive reasoning is: whenever there is smoke in
the kitchen there must be a fire there. Generalization
of this is then made to conclude that, wherever there
is smoke there must be fire – i.e. independent
of any condition. This generalization is by induction,
that smoke cannot exist independently of fire.
The advaitic position differs from that of the naiyAyika-s
in several aspects as outlined by VP. According to the naiyAyika-s,
inferential knowledge involves several steps. With reference
to the fire example, the steps involved are as follows:
First we see smoke in a kitchen, etc. Second, we
recollect that smoke is never without a fire. Third,
we consider that the smoke is on the distant hill
where fire has to be inferred by the process of ‘parAmarsha’,
which involves reflection and consideration. Thus
this third step, involving parAmarsha, is instrumental
for the inferential knowledge. VP dismisses these
procedural processes. It says we cannot establish
that this parAmarsha is required for the inferential
knowledge. parAmarsha involves brooding over the observations
and vyApti to arrive at the conclusion that the distant
hill is on fire. VP says that it takes place by vyApAra
and not parAmarsha [i.e. something actually happening rather than mere thought]. vyApAra is related to vyApti.
It involves immediate recollection or transaction
with the concomitant relation between the hetu and
sAdhya. Hence, as soon as I see the smoke on the distant
hill, I remember the universal relation that smoke
cannot exist without a fire and therefore immediately
infer that there is fire on the distant hill. There
is no need to reflect on the matter. The vyApti is
already a universalized relation based on prior particular
observation. Hence VP says that, when the vyApti is
available in the mind, then VyApAra (here connecting
the smoke to the fire via the vyApti) can take place
in the mind without any parAmarsha being required.
In order for the inferential knowledge to take place, one should
have knowledge of the concomitant relation. The knowledge should
be available with the person as a latent impression in the
mind, ready for its immediate operation, vyApAra or use, as
soon as the hetu is observed. ‘Latent impression’ is
not the same as ‘recollection’, but is a source
for it. It is similar to saying that, when I go into the deep
sleep state, all the knowledge I have goes into a latent form,
which can be materialized as soon as I wake up.
Hence, ‘recollection’ for the advaitin is
not the same as is understood by the naiyAyika-s. For
the naiyAyika-s, recollection involves two aspects:
its non-existence in the mind before a thing is recollected
and its non-existence later after the operation of inferential
knowledge. This means that the recollected information
was not present in the mind before or after. It is produced
when it is needed and destroyed when its function is
over. These are called prAk abhAva and pradhvamsa abhAva,
i.e. its
non-existence before and non-existence after. The reason they
subscribe to this is due to their belief in asat kArya vAda,
that existence comes from its non-existence. E.g. in the example
of a pot, the pot came into existence from its prior non-existence
and it returns to non-existence when it gets destroyed. Thus,
non-existence of a thing forms the ‘cause’ for its
later existence. In the current example, the recollection of
the vyApti involves its coming into existence in my mind (so
that I become aware of it) from its prior non-existence. And,
after the inferential knowledge has taken place, it goes back
to its non-existent state.
VP rejects these arguments. If existence came from non-existence,
this would violate the fundamental law that non-existence can
never become existence (nAsato vidyate bhAvaH). Besides, there
is no particular reason why a specific vyApti that happens
to be needed should come into existence, since any vyApti might
arise from its non-existence. In addition, there is no reason
to have a prior vyApti to be established by dRRiShTAnta or observation.
Advaita does not subscribe to asat kArya vAda. The vyApti is
in potential or latent form in the mind, and comes into existence
when needed. When there are many types of vyApti-s stored in
a latent or potential form, only that which is relevant will
come up for recollection. In the example, it is the vyApti that
relates the smoke to fire. ‘Latent impression’ means
that it exists as latent, just as a pot exists in potential form
in the clay. This is called saMskAra or latent impression in
the mind about the concomitant relation.
Proceed to the next essay. |
